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NOTES AND COMMENT

find in 126 Wis. 270...2 * * * that necessity must be so clear and
absolute that without the easement the grantee cannot in any reasonable sense be said to have acquired that which is expressly granted;
such indeed as render inconceivable that the parties could have dealt
in the matter without both intending to confer the easement." Quite
clearly, then, Wisconsin is not among the states which enforces the
doctrine of a "reasonable" necessity.
Under such clearly defined policy, the court could see no use of
reading into the words, "Commencing at a point * * * so that an
alley might be established" any express grant of this strip as an alley
and especially when it is considered that at the time of the grant both
the lot sold and the strip now involved were completely submerged.
No evidence was presented which would show that this strip had
been dedicated to a public use. Apparently no plat of this area was
ever filed to indicate any intention to make a dedication, nor had there
ever been any acceptance by the city either by way of ordinance or
otherwise upon which to base a claim of dedication.
Likewise, because the question of estoppel was not pleaded, the
court would not consider whether the long continued user, or Elmore's
permitting Detry to fill in this strip so as to make it passable, misled
Detry into the mistaken idea that he had a right to this strip as an
alley. The pleadings did not set forth facts which would establish an
easement by prescription, dedication or grant, and the defendant must
discontinue his user of this way.
LAWRENCE WALSH.

Criminal Law: Searches and Seizures
In Warner et al. v. Gregory et al, ____ Wis.
233 N.W. 631,
an order directing trustees for the benefit of creditors to permit the
district attorney to examine the books in the trustees' possession for
use in a criminal investigation against the assignors, a copartnership
was held not to violate the 4th Amendment to the U. S. constitution,
protecting the citizens from unreasonable search and seizure, nor the
5th Amendment, providing that no person shall be witness against
himself.
This protection, guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendmentse
have been construed to apply to private papers, books and documents
of an individual as well as safeguarding his home from unreasonable
search and himself from incrimination. Gouled v. U. S. 255 U.S. 298;
Boyd v. U. S.116 U.S. 616; Johnson v. U. S.47 L.R.A. (n.s.) 263.
The protection thus guaranteed is fully recognized by the Federal
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 7, No. 9, Chap. 3, which, though it provides that
it is the duty of the bankrupt to "submit to an examination concerning
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the conductng of hs business, the cause of his bankruptcy, his dealings
with his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and whereabouts of his property, and in addition, all matters which may affect
the administration and settlement of his estate" declares that "no testimony given by him (the bankrupt) shall be offered in evidence against
hit in any criminal proceeding.
In the present case, the assignors (plaintiffs) sought to prevent the
District Attorney of Dane County from making a criminal investigation of their books, now in the hands of trustees, on the grounds that
such examination would be unreasonable in the light of the fourth
amendment, and the results of such investigation might be incriminating, thus in essence, forcing the accused to testify against himself and
thereby contravening the fifth amendment.
In Dier v. Banton 262 U.S. 147, precisely the same situation is
presented, and in reply to the above contentions, Chief Justice Taft
lays down the distinction which is basic in Warner v. Gregory. "The
right of the alleged bankrupt to protest against the use of his books
and papers relating to his business as evidence against him, ceases as
soon as his possession' and control over the pass from him by order
directing their delivery into the hand of the receiver and into the
custody of the court." Thus "a party is privileged from producing the
evidence, but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228
U.S. 457. Since the books were in the hands of the trustees, the appellants were not dealt with personally. "No compulsion is to be applied
or used to affect their volition in the matter; nothing is to be taken
from their possession; their persons are not to be subjected to any
procedure; no question is asked that they are obliged to answer.,
Justice Fairchild, in Warner v. Gregory.
In State v. Straut, 94 Minn. 384, there was a voluntary bankruptcy,
and the bankrupt's books and papers were turned over to the trustee
without objection, and it was held that the bankrupts constitutional
privilege against self incrimination was not infringed upon by the
production by the trustee of such books before the grand jury. It may
be noted that the fact that the bankruptcy proceedings were voluntary
probably would not differentiate the case front those in which the proceedings were involuntary (Re Harris 55 L. ed. U.S. 732)
The contrary doctrine is expressed in Blum et al. v. State, 94 Md.
375, wherein the court held that the "fact that books of account kept
by persons in the conduct of their business have been voluntarily
turned over by them to receivers appointed in a proceeding instituted
by consent will not render the books admissible in evidence against
them in a criminal prosecution without their consent, the books not
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being turned over to the receivers for any such purpose." (See note:
47 L.R.A. [n.s.] 265.)
The ruling in Blum v. State, supra, finds support in Hazlett's
Estate, 8 Pa. Dist. R. 201, wherein, in holding that the books of one
being prosecuted for fraudulently receiving bank deposits while insolvent, which were in the hands of assignees for the benefit of creditors, could not be used in aid of the prosecution over the protest of
such assignees, the court said that the books were still the property of
tthe assignor, and that assignees occupying a representative capacity
towards the assignors, ought not to be compelled to produce his books
where he himself would not be compelled to do so.
The 'views expressed by the courts in Blum v. State, supra, and
Hazlett's Estate, supra, represent the minority view, the Wisconsin
court holding with the majority in Warner v. Gregory when it declares
that the relationship existing between the assignors and the trustees,
is not of such a personal and confidential nature, that an order compelling the trustees to hand over the books to the District Attorney
for criminal investigation infringes upon the copartners' (assignors)
constitutional rights.
It has generally been held that a "subpoena duces tecum, 'an order
to produce documents, is not in violation of the security from unreasonable search and seizure expressed by Amendment four. Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co., 155 Wis. 201; Wheeler v.
U. S. 478. However, the bankrupt is not without protection of the 4th
and 5th Amendments. Chief Justice Taft, in Dier v. Banton, supra,
further clarifies the distinction which is the basis of the.Wisconsin
holding. "It may be that the allegation of bankruptcy will not be maintained, and, in that case, the alleged bankrupt will be entitled to a
return of his property including his books and papers; and when they
are returned,he may refuse to produce them and stand on his constitutional rights. But while they are in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, taken out of his possession and control, his immunity from
producing them secured under the fourth and fifth amendments does
not innure to his protection * * * "

This distinction is exemplified in Greenbaum v. U. S., 280 Fed.
474, wherein a bankrupt, who has been discharged by confirmation of
a composition of creditors, so as to become revested with title to his
property, including his books, could not, in prosecution against him
for fraudulently concealing assets, be required to produce the books
to be used as evidence in the criminal prosecution.
If the relationship between assignor and trustee in Warner v.
Gregory, was held not to be personal and confidential, In re Jefferson,
96 Fed. 826, upheld the wife's right to be silent in matters pertaining
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to her husband's bankruptcy. "To compel the wife of a bankrupt under
examination as a witness in bankruptcy proceeding to disclose confidential communications made to her by her husband in regard to his
property or income, would be contrary to the fourth amendment to
the constitution of the United States prohibiting unreasonable search
and seizure."
GEORGE J. LAIKIN.

Negligence: Liability of Manufacturers,Wholesalers
A seven and one-half year old plaintiff was given a Fourth of July
"sparkler" by one Howell, who, however, warned her that the "sparkler" wire would become red hot. Howell had purchased the "sparklers"
from Weimann Mask & Novelty Co." wholesalers, who had secured
them from Rutter & Lechler, manufacturers; all were joined as defendants in an action for damages resulting from the "sparkler" wire
coming in contact with plaintiff's dress, igniting it, and injuring the
plaintiff. Conceded that the sparks from such fireworks are harmless,
but that the wire become red hot; it is not claimed that the particular
"sparkler" was defective or different from ordinary product. There
was a nonsuit in favor of wholesaler and fanufacturer; upon trial
Howell was found by the jury to have exercised ordinary care under
the circumstances. Judgment for the defendant. HELD: In the
absence of negligent preparation for market or of defective construction or of concealed defects, such "sparkler" is not an inherently
dangerous instrument. Judgment affirmed. Beznor v. Howell et al., 233
N.W. 758. Dec. 9, 1930.
In the decision two cases were cited in which "sparklers" were
directly considered:
Schmidt v. Capital Candy Co., 139 Minn. 378, 166 N.W. 502 * * *
A seven year old plaintiff was burned by "Clark Electric Sparkler
Sucker." The Minnesota court held that although "The law requires
of him who deals in articles inherently dangerous in the use for which
they are intended to refrain from placing the same in the hands of a
child of tender years," nonetheless, "we do not think the article sold
in the instant case so inherently dangerous as to render the seller liable,
without proof of knowledge on his part of some ocncealed danger,
not apparent from mere inspection."
Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N.Y.S. 642 * * * The

jury found that the defendant was negligent in offering the "sparkler
for sale for use by children. In sustaining this verdict the court quoted
the legal principle, " * * * Such manufacturer is liable to one with

whom it has no contractual relation, if such article was put out in a
defective condition, which defect ought to. have been discovered or

